What are we exposed to, and what can we turn off? Lessons from Polymarket
What are we exposed to, and what can we turn off? Several companies I have worked with have asked me those two questions since October 29.
That day, Polymarket customers lost about $2.7 million from more than 700 wallets. The attackers came in through a performance monitoring script from DebugBear that Polymarket loaded on its pages. Once the script was tampered with, it ran inside customers' logged-in sessions with the same reach as Polymarket's own code. Polymarket's fix was to remove it.
Most owners cannot answer either question, and nobody did anything wrong. The chat widget came with the website. The booking tool, the review badge, the analytics tag and the payment plugin were each added by a different person, for a good reason, years apart. Each one is another company's code running on your pages, and its security is now part of yours.
Each one also has to be kept current. This week CISA added a WordPress flaw to its list of vulnerabilities being actively exploited. It is closed only on sites running 7.1.4 or the patched release for their branch.
So ask whoever runs the site for one list: every script, plugin and connected service, who added it, what it can see, and what stops working without it. Anything nobody can explain is the first thing to switch off.
The list always runs longer than anyone guessed.